

Report

Polish-Turkish Relations in 2026: President Karol Nawrocki's Visit to Türkiye and Its Portrayal in the Turkish Media



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Introduction

President Karol Nawrocki's visit to Türkiye on 23-24 June 2026 took place at a particularly significant moment for both Polish-Turkish relations and European security. Coming two weeks before the NATO Summit in Ankara, the visit placed bilateral talks within the broader debate on the future of the Alliance, European states' responsibility for their own security, and the situation on NATO's eastern and southern flanks. At the same time, defence industry cooperation, economic relations, the Three Seas Initiative, Türkiye's relations with the European Union, and regional issues—above all the Russia-Ukraine war and the situation in the Middle East—featured prominently on the agenda.

The purpose of this report is not only to present the course of the visit and the key statements made by the two presidents, but also to analyse how the visit was portrayed within the Turkish information space. The analysis therefore covers traditional media outlets representing different political profiles and ownership structures, as well as social media, official institutional channels, accounts associated with the defence industry, news aggregators, and OSINT accounts.

The analysis seeks to answer two fundamental questions. First, which elements of the visit were regarded as the most important in Türkiye, and how were they incorporated into broader narratives concerning foreign policy, security, and Türkiye's position? Second, to what extent did the portrayal of the visit depend on the political profile of individual media outlets, and to what extent was it the result of editorial reliance on the same news agency reports, official statements, and remarks by the two presidents?

The material analysed shows that the visit was portrayed primarily as confirmation of the growing importance of strategic cooperation between Poland and Türkiye. Security, NATO, and the defence industry received the greatest emphasis, although trade, Türkiye's relations with the European Union, and the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations also featured prominently. At the same time, the analysis reveals differences between the official course of the visit and the ways in which particular elements were selected, amplified, and interpreted within the Turkish media environment.

Chapter 1

From Anıtkabir to İncirlik - Two Days of Strategic Diplomacy

On 23-24 June, at the invitation of the President of the Republic of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of the Republic of Poland, Karol Nawrocki, paid a two-day official visit to Türkiye. He arrived in Ankara on the evening of 22 June. At Ankara Esenboğa Airport, the President and his delegation were welcomed by Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler.

The official programme of the visit began the following day. Its first item was the traditional laying of a wreath at the mausoleum of the first President of the Republic of Türkiye, Kemal Atatürk. This is a standard element of official state visits by foreign heads of state to Ankara. It begins with the delegation walking along the Road of Lions (Aslanlı Yol) to the mausoleum, where it stops before the symbolic sarcophagus. The red-and-white wreath is carried by soldiers of the Honor Guard. They place the wreath, after which the head of state approaches it and symbolically touches it or adjusts the ribbon. President Nawrocki knelt, which was not required by protocol but was received very positively as a gesture of respect. After the wreath-laying ceremony, the head of state proceeds to the National Pact Tower (Misak-ı Millî Kulesi), where an occasional message is entered in the official memorial book.

Another key part of the visit was President Karol Nawrocki's visit to the ASELSAN Technology Base in Gölbaşı. He was accompanied by Haluk Görgün, President of the Presidency of Defence Industries (Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı, SSB), and ASELSAN CEO Ahmet Akyol. The Polish delegation was shown technologies developed by the company, primarily in electronic warfare, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. In December 2025, Poland signed a contract with ASELSAN to purchase electronic warfare systems worth approximately PLN 2 billion (approximately USD 530 million or EUR 460 million). The amount is important because it is often reported incorrectly, as the figure should also change when converting from one currency to another. During the visit, Nawrocki emphasised the importance of cooperation between the Polish and Turkish defence industries and declared Poland's readiness to build an even stronger partnership with Türkiye. He also positively assessed ASELSAN's activities in Poland and the company's cooperation with local partners. According to ASELSAN's statement, further cooperation may include new projects, joint production, technology transfer, and the development of operational capabilities. Cooperation with Poland was also presented in the broader context of NATO security and the growing importance of the Turkish defence industry in Europe.

The next stage of the visit is the official welcome at the Presidential Palace in Ankara. It follows an elaborate ceremonial protocol. The motorcade carrying the foreign delegation is escorted by the Mounted Guard, bearing the flags of both countries. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomes the guest at the main entrance to the palace. The national anthems are played, and when the guest is a head of state, a 21-gun salute is fired. The two presidents walk past the honour guard. The commander reports readiness, and the leaders greet the soldiers. The Turkish phrase “Merhaba Asker” is most commonly used, with the response “Sağ ol.” In addition, 16 warriors dressed in historical costumes are present, symbolising the 16 Great Turkic States (16 Büyük Türk Devleti). According to this concept, the modern Republic of Türkiye is the 17th Turkic state, the successor to sixteen earlier state entities created by Turkic peoples over nearly two thousand years. It is worth noting that this is an element of a particular form of state symbolism rather than a continuity of statehood recognised as a historiographical fact.

No.	State	Turkish name
1	Great Hun Empire	Büyük Hun İmparatorluğu
2	Western Hun Empire	Batı Hun İmparatorluğu
3	European Hun Empire	Avrupa Hun İmparatorluğu
4	White Hun Empire (Hephthalites)	Ak Hun İmparatorluğu
5	Göktürk Khaganate	Göktürk Kağanlığı
6	Avar Khaganate	Avar Kağanlığı
7	Khazar Khaganate	Hazar Kağanlığı
8	Uyghur Khaganate	Uygur Kağanlığı
9	Kara-Khanid State	Karahanlı Devleti
10	Ghaznavid State	Gazne Devleti
11	Great Seljuk Empire	Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu
12	Khwarazmian State	Harezmşahlar Devleti
13	Golden Horde	Altın Orda Devleti
14	Timurid Empire	Timur İmparatorluğu
15	Mughal Empire	Babür İmparatorluğu
16	Ottoman Empire	Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

The ceremony followed the same pattern during President Nawrocki's visit. He greeted the soldiers with the phrase "Merhaba Asker." This was followed by the official presentation of both delegations and their entry into the palace. The ceremony was also attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler, Director of Communications Burhanettin Duran, Chief of Staff Hasan Doğan, Presidential Secretary-General Hakkı Susmaz, Chief Adviser on Foreign Policy and Security Akif Çağatay Kılıç, Türkiye's Ambassador to Warsaw Rauf Alp Denктаş, and Governor of Ankara Yakup Canbolat.

The Polish delegation included, among others, Secretary of State at the National Security Bureau of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland Bartosz Grodecki; Secretary of State at the International Policy Bureau of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland Marcin Przydacz; Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Artur Harazim; Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Ankara Maciej Lang; Undersecretary of State at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland Karol Kazimierz Rabenda; and Secretary of State – Deputy Head of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Poland Jarosław Dębowski.

After the one-on-one meeting, a press conference was held:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan:

- We are countries drawing strength from more than six centuries of shared history. We are allies and strategic partners.
- We have achieved our USD 10 billion target and set a new one - USD 15 billion. Poland is among the countries where Turkish construction companies are most active, with projects worth USD 9 billion.
- Another area with significant potential is transport. The Three Seas Initiative is particularly important in this regard, and Türkiye is a strategic partner.
- The defence industry is a key area of bilateral cooperation. We have carried out numerous joint projects involving unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as other defence initiatives.
- We are NATO countries, and we play an indispensable role in Europe's security architecture. We are continuously working to further strengthen our cooperation.
- We are strengthening our bilateral relations in areas such as education, culture, science, and tourism.
- We aim to develop cooperation with the European Union based on mutual benefit and respect. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Poland for its support for Türkiye's EU accession process, and I hope this support will continue.
- We consider strengthening the transatlantic bond and increasing the responsibility of European allies important.
- Regarding the situation in Iran and Palestine, we believe that processes that should lead to lasting peace in the Middle East must never be pushed into the background. Poland is among the countries that recognise the State of Palestine, and we therefore hope that Poland will continue to support the two-state solution.

Karol Nawrocki:

- Türkiye is one of Poland's most important partners, a proven NATO ally, and a country that plays a key role in ensuring Europe's security, particularly in the Black Sea region.
- Polish historical memory preserves the fact that the Ottoman Empire never formally recognised the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
- A renewed invitation for President Erdoğan to visit Poland.
- One of the main topics was consultations ahead of the NATO Summit in Ankara. We in Poland are right on the front line following the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine, which naturally was also a subject of our discussion.
- Regional formats: the Three Seas Initiative, which aims to build the infrastructure, economy, and financial capacity of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Bucharest Nine initiative, which encompasses NATO's entire eastern flank. The responsibility of NATO's eastern flank cannot be built without recognising the enormous potential represented by Poland in the north, about the Baltic Sea, and by Türkiye, NATO's largest land army in Europe, about the Black Sea. These discussions also revolved around security issues. The upcoming NATO Summit, and I strongly believe this, will demonstrate the unity and internal strength of the Alliance.
- Bilateral relations: in terms of trade, they have increased sevenfold. They have survived both the COVID-19 crisis and the crisis following the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine.
- As regards the G20, Poland, following Donald Trump's invitation, will participate in the G20 Summit for the first time and expects cooperation with Türkiye.
- We are very pleased with Türkiye's role as a strategic partner of the Three Seas Initiative.
- Cooperation in the field of defence. We can move beyond the standard seller-buyer relationship towards cooperation between the Polish and Turkish defence industries. There is significant potential for cooperation. Polish soldiers from the Polish Military Contingent in Türkiye use Bayraktars. Poland was the first to acquire Turkish drones, and the presence of Turkish soldiers in Poland demonstrates the strong alliance between Poland and Türkiye. Our two countries are not only recipients of security but also providers of security in the international arena. We take responsibility for NATO's entire eastern flank, from north to south.
- Since 1988, Poland has supported a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This position has not changed and will not change.
- Hybrid warfare in the Baltic and Black Sea basins, including attacks on Poland's borders, is part of the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare. Poland's position remains unchanged: the Russian Federation is the aggressor, while Ukraine is defending itself. We welcome, with hope, all diplomatic efforts aimed at de-escalating tensions in the Middle East and at resolving the war following the Russian Federation's attack. The Republic of Türkiye is very active in this regard.

On the second day of the visit, the President travelled to İncirlik Air Base near Adana, a Turkish Air Force base supporting NATO operations and home to the Polish Military Contingent, which carries out key missions over the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Poland's presence in Türkiye has been extended until the end of 2026. Patrol and reconnaissance missions from İncirlik Air Base are conducted using Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles operated by the Polish Armed Forces. The Polish Military Contingent (PMC) in Türkiye has been stationed at İncirlik Air Base since May 2021. The mission is carried out as part of NATO's Tailored Assurance Measures for Türkiye.

Chapter 2

President Nawrocki's Visit in Turkish Traditional Media

The analysis of Turkish traditional media shows, above all, a high degree of repetition in coverage of President Karol Nawrocki's visit. This repetition stemmed partly from the widespread use of material from the largest news agencies, primarily Anadolu Ajansı (AA) and Demirören Haber Ajansı (DHA), and partly from most editorial outlets focusing on the same elements of the official programme: the meeting between the presidents, the joint press conference, the visit to the ASELSAN facilities, and the welcoming ceremony. As a result, the core set of information remained similar regardless of the political profile of the medium. Differences were visible primarily in the selection of topics highlighted in headlines, the hierarchy assigned to individual issues, and additional editorial commentary.

In materials covering the joint press conference, the most frequently recurring issues included cooperation within NATO, strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, the defence industry, trade, the Three Seas Initiative, Türkiye's relations with the European Union, and the situations in Ukraine, Iran, and Palestine. However, individual media outlets selected different elements from this broad catalogue as the main frame through which to present the visit. TGRT, CNN Türk, NTV, Evrensel, and BirGün particularly highlighted NATO and European security. Hürriyet placed Türkiye's importance for European Union security at the forefront, while Bloomberg HT and Independent Türkçe focused primarily on the economic dimension of the visit and the goal of increasing Polish-Turkish trade to USD 15 billion. T24 combined both issues in its headline, referring to both trade and Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. This shows that even when reporting on the same press conference, editorial outlets selected the topics they considered most important for their audiences.

A separate group of materials covered President Nawrocki's visit to ASELSAN's facilities in Gölbaşı. The dominant narrative focused on the developing cooperation between the Polish and Turkish defence industries and the growing potential of Türkiye's defence sector. TRT Haber, Yeni Şafak, Haber Global, GDH, Yeniçağ, Telenews TV, and Yeni Akit primarily highlighted the technologies presented to the Polish delegation and the potential to further develop cooperation. The materials referred to electronic warfare systems, radars, air defence, communications, and electro-optics, while some also mentioned the prospect of new projects, joint production, technology transfer, and the development of operational capabilities. The visit to ASELSAN was therefore presented not merely as an item on the diplomatic agenda, but also as an opportunity to demonstrate the technological capabilities of the Turkish defence industry and its growing importance for European and NATO security.

This group of materials also contains a characteristic inaccuracy regarding the value of the contract for electronic warfare systems signed in December 2025. The value was approximately EUR 410 million, or around USD 530 million, yet some Turkish media reported the figure as USD 410 million. This error was subsequently repeated in further publications. It is a good example of how the same inaccuracy can pass from one press report to another, particularly when successive editorial outlets rely on the same sources of information.

Much greater differences emerged when editorial outlets went beyond straightforward reporting on the course of the visit. This was particularly evident in the cases of *Yeni Şafak* and *Yeni Akit*, which expanded on Karol Nawrocki's statement about the Ottoman Empire's historical memory of the partitions of Poland. *Yeni Şafak* presented the Ottoman position as one of the most honourable examples in the history of diplomacy, while simultaneously developing the popular narrative about leaving an empty place for the absent envoy of Lehistan. In this way, the Polish president's statement became a starting point for constructing a positive image of the Ottoman Empire, while the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations was clearly brought to the forefront.

Yeni Akit went even further. The material published on 24 June under the headline "Elin gâvuru anladı, bizimkiler anlamadı!" ("The foreign/infidel understood, while our own did not!") used Nawrocki's statement not only to affirm the Ottoman legacy but also as a commentary directed at the Turkish audience. The way the Polish president's words were translated is also significant. Nawrocki referred to the belief in Polish historical memory that the Ottoman Empire had never formally recognised the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the Turkish material, the statement was presented much more categorically, as a claim that the Turkish state had not accepted Poland's disappearance from the map. The translation therefore removed an important qualification concerning the nature of this historical narrative. Moreover, the comments under the material also included the story of the Sultan's symbolic question about the absent envoy of Lehistan, showing that this narrative was reproduced by the audience as well.

The materials published by *Yeni Şafak* and *Yeni Akit* thus demonstrate a way of using history that went beyond simply recalling centuries-old Polish-Turkish relations. Neither outlet used the concept of neo-Ottomanism, yet in both cases the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was presented as a source of Türkiye's contemporary prestige. The words of a foreign leader served a particularly useful function here, because the positive assessment of Ottoman policy did not originate in a Turkish editorial outlet but was attributed to the President of Poland and subsequently developed and reinforced by Turkish media.

A different problem arose in the *Ülke* TV material titled "Türkiye'den Polonya'ya 'İHA' Jesti!" ("Türkiye's 'UAV gesture' towards Poland!"). The headline suggested the emergence of a new element of drone-related cooperation, whereas the material itself was a fragment of the press conference and contained no information about any new "gesture", transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles, or conclusion of a new agreement. The headline therefore attributed significance to the material that was not borne out by its content and could mislead the audience about the actual outcomes of the visit.

Habertürk was another interesting case. In its coverage of the visit, Polish-Turkish relations were presented primarily through the lens of strategic defence cooperation. The starting point was Poland's purchase of Bayraktar drones in 2021, followed by a reference to the change in the European security situation after 2022 and Türkiye's growing importance as a country with a developed domestic defence industry. It was also emphasised that Nawrocki's visit took place immediately before the NATO Summit in Ankara and that the Polish president was most likely the last foreign leader to visit Erdoğan before this event. Unlike some materials that limited themselves to reproducing the statements of the two presidents, *Habertürk* therefore sought to place the visit within the broader context of changes in European security following Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

Not all media, however, attributed broader political significance to the visit. OdaTV and Cumhuriyet confined their coverage to brief details of Nawrocki's arrival in Ankara and his airport welcome by Defence Minister Yaşar Güler. NTV broadcast the joint press conference without additional interpretation. This shows that an opposition profile did not automatically entail a critical presentation of the visit. In some editorial outlets, it instead meant downplaying its significance through a short, agency-style format and the absence of original commentary. Against the background of the other materials, RS FM - Radio Sputnik's coverage stood out. Rather than focusing on Polish-Turkish relations, defence cooperation, or the NATO Summit, the material used Nawrocki as a starting point for a broader critique of Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Europe was portrayed as dependent on the United States and acting as its vassal, while Russia was depicted as more independent and technologically and energetically more advanced. This narrative clearly differed from the dominant coverage in Turkish media, regardless of their attitude towards the government.

The analysis therefore shows that the differences between Turkish media were not primarily about the basic facts of the visit, but about how they were selected and prioritised. Four main frames dominated the coverage: security and NATO, defence industry cooperation, the economy, and the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations. Pro-government media most often presented the visit as confirmation of Türkiye's growing role in NATO, European security, and the defence industry, although the way this narrative was constructed differed between outlets. Opposition media, by contrast, did not create a single alternative interpretation of the visit: some reported on it in a manner similar to mainstream media, while others limited themselves to brief agency reports. The greatest departures from the common informational base appeared not in the facts themselves, but in headlines, historical commentary, translations of statements, and the selection of those elements of the visit that individual editorial outlets considered most important.

Television and Radio

Show Ana Haber [1] 23 June 2026 (pro-government station, focusing mainly on sensational and social news, avoiding direct criticism of the government)	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Türkiye'de (The President of Poland in Türkiye)	• Coverage of the official reception of President Karol Nawrocki in Ankara. • The issue of deepening Polish-Turkish cooperation. • Particular emphasis on President Erdoğan's statement concerning Palestine and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Telenews TV [2] 23 June 2026 (pro-government / nationalist station, focusing on national technologies, the defence industry, and relations with the Turkic world)	ASELSAN'da Tarihi Ziyaret. Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Türk Teknolojisine Hayran Kaldı (Historic Visit to ASELSAN. The President of Poland Was Impressed by Turkish Technology)	• President Nawrocki's visit to ASELSAN presented as marking a new stage in Polish-Turkish defence cooperation. • Opportunities for cooperation in advanced technologies. • Clear emphasis on the attractiveness of Turkish technologies to Poland.

[1] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0bMS3M-pR7A>

[2] <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/xzuHQWgxog0>

Ülke TV [3] 23 June 2026 (pro-government, conservative)	Türkiye'den Polonya'ya 'İHA' Jesti! (Türkiye's "gesture" towards Poland concerning unmanned aerial vehicles!)	- Fragment of the presidents' press conference. - No information about any "gesture" concerning unmanned aerial vehicles, despite the suggestion contained in the title of the material.
Ulusal Kanal TV [4] 23 June 2026 (nationalist / Eurasianist / generally pro-government)	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki Türk askerini coşkuyla selamlayınca Erdoğan böyle tepki verdi (This is how Erdoğan reacted when Polish President Nawrocki enthusiastically greeted Turkish soldiers)	- Short material devoted to President Nawrocki greeting Turkish soldiers with the words "Merhaba Asker". - Nawrocki asking Erdoğan whether he had greeted the soldiers correctly, followed by an approving gesture from the Turkish president. - Wide reach of the material: 9 million views and 49,000 likes.
RS FM - Radio Sputnik 24 June 2026 (pro-Russian, anti-Western, post-communist; operating in Türkiye and supporting narratives aligned with Russian interests)	Eksen (Axis)	- Critical narrative concerning President Nawrocki's attitude towards Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. - Accusations of Western hypocrisy regarding human rights, equality, and war crimes. - Presentation of Poland, Ukraine, and Europe more broadly as subordinate to the United States. - Contrast between Europe's dependence on the United States and Russia, portrayed as more technologically and energetically advanced and independent. - Material clearly departing from the dominant coverage of the visit itself and Polish-Turkish relations.
NTV [5] 23 June 2026 (neutral television station)	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara'da (The President of Poland in Ankara)	Broadcast of the press conference of the presidents of Türkiye and Poland, without additional interpretation.

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccvm9_fXn5g

[4] https://www.youtube.com/shorts/-14_v07cFal

[5] https://youtu.be/UU1CdvrngJI?is=ZldUhqAXziU23_oQ

Habertürk [6] (formerly an independent medium, currently under state control)	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara'da (The President of Poland in Ankara)	• Polish-Turkish defence cooperation presented as strategic, with particular emphasis on the purchase of Bayraktar drones and defence contracts. • The Russian-Ukrainian war as a factor increasing the importance of cooperation between Poland and Türkiye. • Emphasis on Türkiye's ability to meet 80% of its own defence industry requirements. • Discussion of elements of the official welcoming ceremony. • Nawrocki's visit presented as probably Erdoğan's final meeting with a foreign leader before the NATO Summit.
24TV [7] (conservative, pro-government television station)	Erdoğan'dan Polonya'ya Filistin Çağrısı (Erdoğan's Appeal to Poland on Palestine)	• Fragment of the press conference devoted to the situation in Iran and Palestine. • Emphasis on Erdoğan's appeal for Poland to continue supporting the two-state solution.

[6] <https://www.youtube.com/live/6KRNurlwQE?is=wcohFgvDVtK3QbIZ>

[7] <https://youtu.be/2KndRySgha8?is=S8AkSWGAvQNGFEJk>

News Portals

Anadolu Ajansı [8] AA Analiz Emrah Dokuzlu, 25 June 2026	Nawrocki'nin Ankara ziyareti: Savunma sanayisi işbirliğinden Karadeniz'de NATO stratejisine (Nawrocki's visit to Ankara: from defence industry cooperation to NATO strategy in the Black Sea)	• The visit presented as an event of strategic significance extending beyond bilateral relations; particular importance attached to its timing – two weeks before the NATO Summit in Ankara. • The historical narrative concerning the non-recognition of the partitions used to present Türkiye as a state that has traditionally respected Polish independence. • Defence cooperation as the main area for the development of relations; the possibility of moving from arms purchases to joint production and technology transfer. • Poland and Türkiye as complementary partners: Poland's needs resulting from the modernisation of its armed forces and the advanced capabilities of the Turkish defence industry. • Different perceptions of Russia: an existential threat for Poland; an adversary for Türkiye that should be balanced without excessive escalation. • Possible role of Polish-Turkish cooperation in bringing together the perspectives of NATO's eastern and southern flanks: Poland focused on Russia, while Türkiye is also focused on terrorism, migration, Syria, the Mediterranean, and energy security. • Difference in tone between the two presidents: Nawrocki – deterrence and defence of NATO's flanks; Erdoğan – greater emphasis on peace and diplomatic efforts. • Economic issues and the Three Seas Initiative – consistent with the message of the press conference. • Main thesis: the growing strategic importance of relations between Poland and Türkiye, particularly in the areas of the defence industry, the Black Sea, and cooperation within NATO. • An analytical text by Emrah Dokuzlu rather than AA's official position; joint production, technology transfer, and other directions of further cooperation presented as the author's interpretations.
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[8] <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/nawrockinin-ankara-ziyareti-savunma-sanayisi-isbirliginden-karadenizde-nato-stratejisine/3977514>

Anadolu Ajansı [9] 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'den ASELSAN Gölbaşı Tesisleri'ne ziyaret (Polish President Karol Nawrocki visits the ASELSAN facilities in Gölbaşı)	• Visit to ASELSAN and the development of Polish-Turkish defence cooperation. • Presentation of technologies in the fields of electronic warfare, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. • Haluk Görgün: potential for further cooperation in defence electronics, radars, communications, and electro-optics. • Nawrocki: the need to further strengthen cooperation between the defence industries and exchange experience; positive assessment of ASELSAN's activities in Poland and cooperation with local partners. • The value of the December 2025 contract stated as approximately USD 410 million. • According to ASELSAN, new projects under consideration include joint production, technology transfer, and the development of operational capabilities. • The contract presented as an example of the growing importance of the Turkish defence industry for European security and NATO.
Anadolu Ajansı [10] Zafer Fatih Beyaz, Mehmet Şah Yılmaz, 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Polonya ile iki NATO müttefikleri olarak işbirliğimizi güçlendirmek için çalışıyoruz (President Erdoğan: As two NATO allies, we are working to strengthen our cooperation with Poland)	• Extensive coverage of the press conference – the main themes consistent with the content of Chapter I. • Strategic partnership, NATO, defence cooperation, trade, the Three Seas Initiative, Türkiye–EU relations, and the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East. • NATO Summit in Ankara: strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, deterrence, and transatlantic ties. • Nawrocki: cooperation between the defence industries should take place on equal terms and develop in various forms. • Declaration of willingness to maintain and extend the presence of Polish soldiers at İncirlik. • Energy and people-to-people contacts mentioned alongside education, culture, science, and tourism as areas for further cooperation.

[9] <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiden-aselsan-golbasi-tesislerine-ziyaret/3975599>

[10] <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-polonya-ile-iki-nato-muttefikleri-olarak-isbirligimizi-guclendirmek-icin-calisiyoruz/3975698>

Demirören Haber Ajansı (DHA) [11] 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Avrupa Birliği ile iş birliğimizi ilerletme iradesine sahibiz (President Erdoğan: We have the will to advance our cooperation with the European Union)	• Extensive coverage of the press conference; most themes consistent with Chapter I. • Particular emphasis on Türkiye's cooperation with the EU and Poland's support for Türkiye's accession process. • Trade, investment, the defence industry, the Three Seas Initiative, NATO, Ukraine, Iran, and Palestine. • Declaration of maintaining the Polish military presence at İncirlik. • Energy and people-to-people contacts as additional areas of cooperation. • Education, culture, science, and tourism presented by Erdoğan as an "investment in the future" of Polish-Turkish relations.
DHA [12] 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'yi resmi törenle karşıladı (President Erdoğan officially welcomed Polish President Nawrocki)	• Coverage of the official welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex – its course consistent with the description in Chapter I. • National anthems, a drill display by the Presidential Guard Regiment, and a 21-gun salute. • Symbolism of the 16 historical Turkic states. • Nawrocki greeting the soldiers with the words "Merhaba Asker". • Following the ceremony – bilateral talks; no information on their course or outcomes.
DHA [13] 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki, ASELSAN'ı ziyaret etti (Polish President Nawrocki visited ASELSAN)	• Visit to ASELSAN and the prospect of deepening Polish-Turkish defence cooperation. • Presentation of ASELSAN's domestic technologies, engineering capabilities, and production infrastructure. • Defence electronics, radars, communications, and electro-optics as potential areas for further cooperation. • Poland and Türkiye described by Haluk Görgün as "two strong NATO allies". • No information about the signing of a new agreement, specific negotiations, or Poland's planned purchase of particular systems.

[11] <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-avrupa-birligi-ile-is-birligimizi-ilerletme-iradesine-sahibiz-2897181>

[12] <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-yi-resmi-torenl-karsiladi-2897128>

[13] <https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-aselsani-ziyaret-etti-2896992>

DHA [14] 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki, Anıtkabir'i ziyaret etti (Polish President Nawrocki visited Anıtkabir)	• Protocol-focused coverage of the visit to Anıtkabir – its course consistent with the description in Chapter I. • Walk along the Road of Lions, laying of a wreath, a moment of silence, and an entry in the Memorial Book. • Presence of Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler. • No information about the content of Nawrocki's entry in the Memorial Book.
DHA [15] 22 June 2026	Bakan Güler, Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'yi Esenboğa Havalimanı'nda karşıladi (Minister Güler welcomed Polish President Nawrocki at Esenboğa Airport)	• Karol Nawrocki's arrival in Ankara on the evening of 22 June, before the start of the official programme of the visit on 23–24 June. • Welcome at Ankara Esenboğa Airport by Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler. • Brief protocol-focused information, without details concerning the programme or composition of the delegation.
DHA [16] 22 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Karol Nawrocki 23-24 Haziran'da Türkiye'de (Polish President Karol Nawrocki to visit Türkiye on 23–24 June)	• Announcement of the official visit on 23–24 June at the invitation of President Erdoğan. • Information provided by Director of Communications Burhanettin Duran. • Announcement of a comprehensive review of Polish-Turkish relations and measures aimed at further deepening cooperation. • Regional and global issues as the second area of the planned talks, without specifying particular topics.

[14] <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-anitkabiri-ziyaret-etti-2896891>

[15] <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/bakan-guler-polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiyi-esenboga-havalimaninda-karsiladi-2896590>

[16] <https://www.dha.com.tr/politika/polonya-cumhurbaskani-karol-nawrocki-23-24-haziranda-turkiyede-2896531>

Yeni Akit [17] (radical Islamist, far-right, pro-government) 23 June 2026	ASELSAN'ı ziyaret eden Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki: Türkiye ile daha güçlü ittifaka hazırız (Polish President Nawrocki, who visited ASELSAN: "We are ready for a stronger alliance with Türkiye")	• President Nawrocki's visit to ASELSAN and presentation of technologies in the fields of electronic warfare, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. • Nawrocki: the need to further strengthen cooperation between the defence industries and exchange experience. • Positive assessment of ASELSAN's activities in Poland and the company's cooperation with local partners. • According to ASELSAN's statement, prospects for new projects, joint production, technology transfer, and the development of operational capabilities. • Cooperation with Poland presented as an example of the growing importance of the Turkish defence industry for European security and NATO.
Yeni Akit [18] 23 June 2026	Başkan Erdoğan: "NATO'nun caydırıcılığı ortak hedef" (President Erdoğan: "NATO deterrence is a common goal")	• Coverage of the press conference – the main themes consistent with the content of Chapter I. • Particular emphasis on the role of Poland and Türkiye as two important NATO allies and the importance of cooperation between their defence industries. • Trade, Türkiye–EU relations, the Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran, and Palestine. • NATO deterrence presented in the headline itself as a common goal of Poland and Türkiye.
Yeni Akit [19] 24 June 2026	Elin gâvuru anladı, bizimkiler anlamadı! Polonya liderinden çok konuşulacak "Osmanlı" göndermesi (The foreign "infidel" understood, while our own did not! The Polish leader's much-discussed reference to the Ottoman Empire)	• Particular emphasis on the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations and Nawrocki's statement concerning the Ottoman Empire's attitude towards the partitions of Poland. • Development by the editorial staff of the narrative of the Ottoman Empire as a state that consistently refused to recognise the elimination of Poland for 120 years. • Use of the Polish president's statement to affirm the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, also visible in the ideologically charged headline of the material. • Change in the meaning of Nawrocki's statement in translation: his reference to the established belief in Polish historiography that the Ottoman Empire did not recognise the partitions of Poland was presented as an unequivocal statement that the Turkish state did not recognise Poland's disappearance from the map. • A reader's comment developing the popular narrative about leaving an empty place for the envoy of Lehistan and his symbolic absence from the Ottoman court.

[17] <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/foto-galeri/aselsani-ziyaret-eden-polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-turkiye-ile-daha-guclu-ittifaka-haziriz-162283>

[18] <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/haber/baskan-erdogandan-onemli-aciklamalar-2009034.html>

[19] <https://www.yeniakit.com.tr/foto-galeri/elin-gavuru-anladi-bizimkiler-anlamadi-polonya-liderinden-cok-konusulacak-osmanli-gondermesi-162328>

TGRT [20] (nationalist-conservative, corporate-conservative, pro-government) Nalan Güler Güven, 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Polonyalı mevkidaşı Nawrocki ile ortak basın toplantısında konuştu: Avrupalı müttefikler daha fazla sorumluluk almalı (President Erdoğan during the joint press conference with his Polish counterpart Nawrocki: European allies should take on greater responsibility)	• Material based on Anadolu Ajansı's coverage of the joint press conference – the main themes consistent with Chapter I. • Particular emphasis on the need for European NATO allies to take on greater responsibility. • Strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and its deterrence capabilities while maintaining a strong transatlantic bond. • Cooperation between the Polish and Turkish defence industries as an element of the European security architecture. • Trade, Turkish projects in Poland, transport, and the Three Seas Initiative. • Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. • The Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran, and the two-state solution in Palestine.
Haber Global [21] (supported by Azerbaijan, mainstream, nationalist-conservative, pro-government) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki, ASELSAN'ı ziyaret etti (Polish President Nawrocki visited ASELSAN)	• Coverage of President Nawrocki's visit to the ASELSAN facilities in Gölbaşı. • Presentation of domestic technologies, engineering capabilities, and production infrastructure of the Turkish defence industry. • Defence electronics, radar systems, communications, and electro-optics as potential areas for further cooperation. • Haluk Görgün: the possibility of further strengthening cooperation between the defence industries of two "strong NATO allies". • The material focuses on the potential of ASELSAN and the Turkish defence industry; no statements by Nawrocki and no information about new contracts or specific negotiations.
Yeni Şafak [22] (Islamist, conservative-nationalist, strongly pro-government, belonging to the Albayrak Group) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'den ASELSAN Gölbaşı Tesisleri'ne ziyaret (Polish President Nawrocki visited the ASELSAN facilities in Gölbaşı)	• President Nawrocki's visit to ASELSAN and presentation of the technological and production potential of the Turkish defence industry. • Defence electronics, radar systems, communications, and electro-optics as potential areas for further cooperation. • Haluk Görgün: the possibility of deepening cooperation between the defence industries of two "strong NATO allies". • No statements by Nawrocki and no information about specific new contracts or projects. • Strong emphasis on Haluk Görgün and his role in the development of Polish-Turkish defence cooperation. • Narrative almost identical to the Haber Global material based on reporting concerning the ASELSAN visit.

[20] <https://www.tgrthaber.com/politika/ankarada-kritik-polonya-zirvesi-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-polonyali-mevkidasi-nawrockiyi-3343481?s=1>

[21] <https://haberglobal.com/gundem/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-aselsani-ziyaret-etti-531161>

[22] <https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiden-aselsan-golbasi-tesislerine-ziyaret-4835008>

Yeni Şafak [23] 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'den anlamlı 'Osmanlı' göndermesi: Haritadan silinmemizi kabul etmeyen tek devlet (A meaningful reference by Polish President Nawrocki to the Ottoman Empire: "The only state that did not accept our being erased from the map")	• Particular emphasis on the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations and Nawrocki's statement concerning the Ottoman Empire's attitude towards the partitions of Poland. • The refusal to recognise the partitions presented as one of the most honourable positions in the history of diplomacy. • Development of the popular narrative concerning the symbolic question about the absent envoy of Lehistan, which was said to have been part of Ottoman ceremonial practice for 120 years. • Use of Nawrocki's statement to construct a highly positive image of the Ottoman Empire and the historical Polish-Turkish friendship. • The historical section reflects the author's narrative rather than a statement by President Nawrocki.
CNN TÜRK [24] (corporate medium, Demirören Group; editorially controlled, pro- government) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara'da: Erdoğan, Nawrocki'yi resmi törenle karşıladı (The President of Poland in Ankara: Erdoğan welcomed Nawrocki during an official ceremony)	• Coverage of the official welcoming ceremony – its course consistent with the description in Chapter I. • Emphasis on the 21-gun salute, the symbolism of the 16 historical Turkic states, and the greeting of the soldiers with the words "Merhaba asker". • Following the ceremony – official photographs and bilateral talks. • No information concerning the content or outcomes of the talks.
CNN TÜRK [25] 24 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Ankara'da! Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Ortak hedef NATO'nun caydırıcılığı (The President of Poland in Ankara! President Erdoğan: NATO deterrence is a common goal)	• Extensive coverage of the press conference – the main themes consistent with Chapter I. • Particular emphasis on NATO deterrence as a common goal of Poland and Türkiye. • Strengthening NATO's European pillar while maintaining a strong transatlantic bond. • Defence cooperation and Bayraktars as an example of the practical dimension of the partnership between the two countries. • Willingness to maintain the Polish military presence at İncirlik. • Trade, Turkish projects in Poland, the Three Seas Initiative, Türkiye–EU relations, the Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran, and Palestine. • Energy and people-to-people contacts indicated as additional areas of bilateral cooperation.

[23] <https://www.yenisafak.com/video-galeri/gundem/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiden-anlamli-osmanli-gondermesi-haritadan-silinmemizi-kabul-etmeyen-tek-devlet-4835068>

[24] <https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/polonya-cumhurbaskani-ankarada-erdogan-nawrockiye-resmi-torenle-karsiladi-3434367>

[25] <https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/son-dakika-haberi-abd-iran-muzakerelerine-ne-diyecek-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ve-polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiden-ortak-aciklama-3434434>

TRT Haber [26] (state-funded public broadcaster, controlled by the government, official channel of state messaging) 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki ASELSAN'ı ziyaret etti (Polish President Nawrocki visited ASELSAN)	• Visit to ASELSAN and presentation of technologies in the fields of electronic warfare, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. • Nawrocki: the need to further strengthen cooperation between the defence industries and exchange experience. • Positive assessment of ASELSAN's activities in Poland and cooperation with local partners. • Acceleration of defence cooperation in the recent period, particularly in electronic warfare and advanced defence systems. • Prospect of new projects, joint production, technology sharing, and increasing operational capabilities. • The December 2025 contract presented as an example of the growing role of the Turkish defence industry in European and NATO security.
TRT Haber [27] 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Nawrocki'yi resmi törenle karşıladı (President Erdoğan welcomed Nawrocki during an official ceremony)	• Detailed coverage of the official welcoming ceremony – its course consistent with the description in Chapter I. • Nawrocki's car escorted by cavalry, national anthems, a 21-gun salute, the symbolism of the 16 historical Turkic states, and the greeting "Merhaba asker". • Following the ceremony – bilateral meeting and joint press conference. • The programme also included an official dinner hosted by Erdoğan in honour of the President of Poland. • Identification of the members of the Turkish delegation participating in the ceremony.
TRT Haber [28] 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı: NATO Zirvesi'nin Ankara'da düzenlenmesi nedeniyle Türkiye'yi tebrik etmek istiyoruz (President of Poland: We would like to congratulate Türkiye on hosting the NATO Summit in Ankara)	• Particular emphasis on Nawrocki's statements and his perspective on Polish-Turkish relations. • Congratulations to Türkiye on hosting the NATO Summit in Ankara and expectations that it would produce concrete results. • Poland and Türkiye as states responsible for defending NATO's flanks; bilateral cooperation as an element strengthening the Alliance as a whole. • Cooperation between the defence industries on equal terms and in various forms. • Bayraktars and the willingness to maintain and extend the presence of Polish soldiers at Incirlik as examples of practical cooperation. • Trade, the G20, and the two-state solution – consistent with the content of Chapter I. • Clear statement by Nawrocki that Poland and Türkiye agree that Russia is the aggressor that attacked Ukraine and that the war should end as quickly as possible through diplomatic means.

[26] <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/ekonomi/polonya-cumhurbaskani-navrocki-aselsani-ziyaret-etti-949087.html>

[27] <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-nawrocki-yesmi-torene-karsiladi-949110.html>

[28] <https://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nato-zirvesinin-ankarada-duzenlenmesi-nedeniyle-turkiyeyi-tebrik-etmek-istiyoruz-949120.html>

Hürriyet [29] (mainstream medium, belonging to the Demirören Group, pro- government, formerly secular-nationalist) 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Türkiye, AB güvenliği için vazgeçilmez (President Erdoğan: Türkiye is indispensable to the security of the European Union)	• Extensive coverage of the press conference – the main themes consistent with Chapter I. • Türkiye's importance for European Union security highlighted already in the headline. • Trade, Turkish projects in Poland, transport, the Three Seas Initiative, and cooperation between the defence industries. • Strengthening NATO's European pillar, deterrence capabilities, and the responsibility of European allies while maintaining the transatlantic bond. • Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. • The Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran, and Palestine – Erdoğan's emphasis on peace and the two-state solution. • Education, culture, science, and tourism as a "joint investment in the future" of the relationship.
Independent Türkçe [30] (independent / mainstream) 23 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Polonya ile ticaret hacmi hedefimizi 15 milyar dolar olarak belirledik (President Erdoğan: We have set our trade volume target with Poland at USD 15 billion)	• Coverage of the press conference supplemented by a description of the official welcoming ceremony. • Particular emphasis on the economic dimension of the visit and the USD 15 billion trade target. • Activity of Turkish companies in Poland and further development of economic cooperation. • Defence cooperation, NATO, Türkiye–EU relations, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and Iran – themes consistent with the press conference. • The two-state solution presented more broadly as a path to lasting peace through the establishment of an independent and sovereign State of Palestine. • Detailed description of the official welcoming ceremony.

[29] <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/son-dakika-cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-onemli-aciklamalar-43216085>

[30] <https://www.indyurk.com/node/778968/haber/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-polonya-ile-ticaret-hacmi-hedefimizi-15-milyar-dolar>

Bloomberg HT [31] (mainstream, economic-financial profile / neutral) 23 June 2026	Erdoğan: Polonya ile ticaret hacmini 15 milyar dolara çıkarmayı hedefliyoruz (Erdoğan: We aim to increase the trade volume with Poland to USD 15 billion)	• Economic dimension of the visit at the forefront: the USD 15 billion trade target and approximately USD 9 billion worth of Turkish projects in Poland. • Transport, the Three Seas Initiative, investment, energy, and people-to-people contacts as elements of a broader economic agenda. • Cooperation between the defence industries on equal terms and in various forms. • Bayraktars and the willingness to extend the presence of Polish soldiers at Incirlik. • NATO and European security as the second main dimension of the material. • Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. • Russian hybrid actions against Poland and agreement between both sides that Russia is the aggressor and that the war should be ended through diplomatic means. • Agreement between both presidents on the two-state solution.
T24 [32] (independent / liberal-opposition) 23 June 2026	Erdoğan ile Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki'den ortak açıklama: Yeni ticaret hacmi hedefi 15 milyar dolar; "Türkiye'nin AB sürecine destek önemli" (Joint statement by Erdoğan and Polish President Nawrocki: the new trade volume target is USD 15 billion; "Support for Türkiye's EU process is important")	• Informational coverage of the press conference and the official welcoming ceremony. • Trade, the Three Seas Initiative, the defence industry, NATO, Türkiye-EU relations, and the regional situation – themes consistent with Chapter I. • Particular emphasis on the USD 15 billion trade target and Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. • Historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations and the narrative concerning the non-recognition of the partitions of Poland. • Invitation for Erdoğan to visit Poland and congratulations to Türkiye on hosting the NATO Summit. • Erdoğan described as "President and Chairman of the AKP" rather than solely by his state office.

[31] <https://www.bloomberght.com/erdogan-polonya-ile-ticaret-hacmini-15-milyar-dolara-cikarmayi-hedefliyoruz-3780996>

[32] https://t24.com.tr/politika/erdogan-ile-polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrockiden-ortak-aciklama-yeni-ticaret-hacmi-hedefi-15-milyar-dolar-turkiyenin-ab-surecine-destek-onemli,1331129?_t=1782304800321

NTV [33] (mainstream news portal / neutral) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki Ankara'da: Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan resmi törenle karşıladı (Polish President Nawrocki in Ankara: President Erdoğan welcomed him during an official ceremony)	• Security and NATO as the main dimension of the coverage of the visit. • Strengthening NATO's European pillar, deterrence capabilities, and greater responsibility of European allies while maintaining transatlantic ties. • Trade, Turkish projects in Poland, transport, the Three Seas Initiative, and defence cooperation. • Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process. • The Russian-Ukrainian war, Iran, and the two-state solution – consistent with the message of the press conference. • Detailed coverage of the official welcoming ceremony.
GDH [34] (Digital News Hub / nationalist-technocratic) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki, ASELSAN'ın teknolojilerini inceledi (Polish President Nawrocki examined ASELSAN's technologies)	• Technological and defence-industrial dimension of the visit at the forefront. • Presentation of electronic warfare technologies, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. • Nawrocki: cooperation between the defence industries as "essential"; the need to share experience. • Positive assessment of ASELSAN's activities in Poland and cooperation with local partners. • Prospect of new projects, joint production, technology sharing, and the development of operational capabilities. • The contract for electronic warfare systems presented as an example of the growing role of the Turkish defence industry in Europe and NATO. • The value of the contract stated as approximately USD 410 million.
OdaTV [35] (nationalist-secular / independent) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki Ankara'da (The President of Poland in Ankara)	• Brief information limited to Nawrocki's arrival in Ankara and his welcome at Esenboğa Airport by Minister Yaşar Güler. • Visit at the invitation of President Erdoğan. • No information on the programme, talks, NATO, defence cooperation, the economy, or regional issues.
Cumhuriyet [36] (secular-left / opposition) 23 June 2026	Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı Nawrocki Ankara'da (Polish President Nawrocki in Ankara)	• Brief news item limited to Nawrocki's arrival in Ankara and his welcome at Esenboğa Airport by Minister Yaşar Güler. • Visit at the invitation of President Erdoğan. • No information on the programme of the visit, its political agenda, NATO, defence cooperation, the economy, or regional issues. • Due to the limited nature of the material, there are no grounds for a broader assessment of how the editorial outlet presented the visit.

[33] <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-ankarada-cumhurbaskani-erdogan-resmi-torenle-karsiladi-1729834>

[34] <https://gdh.digital/haber/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-aselsanin-teknolojilerini-inceledi-u500p85I5I>

[35] <https://www.odatv.com/guncel/polonya-cumhurbaskani-ankarada-120151917>

[36] <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/polonya-cumhurbaskani-nawrocki-ankara-da-2514538>

Evrensel [37] (socialist-left / anti-militarist / opposition) 24 June 2026	Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: NATO Zirvesi'nde Avrupa sütununun güçlendirilmesi ortak önceliğimiz (President Erdoğan: Strengthening the European pillar at the NATO Summit is our common priority)	• NATO and security as the main frame for presenting the visit. • Strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, deterrence, and the responsibility of European allies while maintaining transatlantic ties. • Poland and Türkiye as states responsible for defending NATO's flanks. • Defence cooperation, Bayraktars, and the willingness to maintain the Polish presence at Incirlik. • Trade, Türkiye–EU relations, the Russian-Ukrainian war, and Palestine – consistent with the press conference. • Despite the anti-militarist profile of the medium, the material is primarily reportorial in nature and focuses on the statements of the two presidents.
Yeniçağ [38] (nationalist-secular / independent-opposition) 23 June 2026	ASELSAN ve NATO vurgusu: Polonya Cumhurbaşkanı'ndan dikkat çeken ziyaret (Emphasis on ASELSAN and NATO: a noteworthy visit by the President of Poland)	• Visit to ASELSAN as a manifestation of deepening strategic defence cooperation between Poland and Türkiye. • Electronic warfare technologies, radar systems, air defence, communications, and electro-optics. • Nawrocki: cooperation between the defence industries as “essential” and readiness to build a stronger alliance. • Prospect of new projects, joint production, technology sharing, and increasing operational capabilities. • Positive assessment of ASELSAN's activities in Poland and cooperation with local partners. • The contract presented as an element strengthening the importance of the Turkish defence industry within NATO. • The value of the contract stated as approximately USD 410 million.
BirGün [39] (left-wing / independent / opposition) 23 June 2026	Erdoğan: NATO zirvesinde Avrupa sütununun güçlendirilmesi önceliğimiz (Erdoğan: Strengthening the European pillar at the NATO Summit is our priority)	• NATO and security as the main frame for presenting the visit. • Strengthening NATO's European pillar, deterrence, and the responsibility of European allies while maintaining transatlantic ties. • Poland and Türkiye as states responsible for defending the Alliance's flanks. • Cooperation between the defence industries on equal terms and in various forms. • Bayraktars and the willingness to maintain and extend the presence of Polish soldiers at Incirlik. • Russian hybrid actions against Poland and the need to end the Russian-Ukrainian war through diplomatic means. • Trade, the Three Seas Initiative, Türkiye–EU relations, and Palestine – consistent with the press conference. • Erdoğan described as “Chairman of the AKP and President” rather than solely by his state office.

[37] <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/5989551/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-nato-zirvesi-nde-avrupa-sutunun-guclendirilmesi-ortak-onceligimiz>

[38] <https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com/aselsan-ve-nato-vurgusu-polonya-cumhurbaskanindan-dikkat-ceken-ziyaret-1043768h.htm>

[39] <https://www.birgun.net/haber/erdogan-nato-zirvesinde-avrupa-sutunun-guclendirilmesi-onceligimiz-720092>

Chapter 3


Social Media

The analysis of social media content reveals, above all, the strong presence of three types of actors: official state institutions, accounts linked to the defence industry, and news aggregators and OSINT accounts. In contrast to traditional media, which covered a relatively broad range of issues, including NATO, the economy, relations with the EU, and regional affairs, social media appear to focus much more strongly on the visual, military, and technological dimensions of the visit. Accounts associated with the Turkish defence industry, such as SavunmaTR, SavunmaSanayiST, SanayiSavunmaTR, and Savtekdergi, are particularly visible, as are the official channels of the Ministry of National Defence and ASELSAN.


Institutional accounts and individuals associated with the state administration also play an important role, including Ahmet Akyol, Mustafa Yavuz, Güngör Geçer, and the Directorate of Communications' official Russian-language account. This indicates that communication surrounding the visit served not only as media coverage but also as part of institutional communication and public diplomacy. In this context, the potential for the same content to be further disseminated by sector-specific accounts and news aggregators is particularly significant, as it extends its reach beyond the audiences of official state channels.

At the same time, the presence of accounts such as Sağcı Gazete, Ensonhaber, and Kupür shows how official or semi-official messaging was transferred into a more populist and sensationalist information environment. ConflictTR and Clash Report, in turn, place the visit within a broader information ecosystem focused on security, conflicts, and military technology. This suggests that, on social media, the boundary between coverage of a diplomatic visit and content relating to military capabilities and geopolitics was considerably less distinct than in traditional media.


Against this background, comments under posts by foreign accounts such as Ekonomat, NEXTA, and Clash Report are particularly interesting. They show that discussion of the visit extended beyond the Turkish information space and reached users operating within different political and media contexts. Analysing these reactions can help determine whether audiences reproduced dominant narratives in Turkish media or attributed entirely different meanings to the visit.



Mustafa Yavuz – Governor of Adana. 2,813 followers on X.



Ahmet Yeşiltepe – mainstream journalist with a technocratic profile, also covering cultural and documentary topics; characterised by an institutional and non-confrontational reporting style. 56.1K followers on X and 11.8K followers on Instagram.




İbrahim Karagül – Islamist, ultra-nationalist, staunchly pro-government, conspiratorial, and anti-Western commentator. 663.7K followers on X.



Ahmet Akyol – bureaucratic-technocratic profile, defence industry executive, President and CEO of ASEL SAN, and technocrat associated with the state sector. 34K followers on X and 30.7K followers on Instagram.

Güngör Geçer – bureaucratic-technocratic profile, public official and administrator associated with state structures, serving as Acting Mayor of Adana Metropolitan Municipality. 1,464 followers on X and 11.7K followers on Instagram.






Sağcı Gazete (@sagcigazete – X / social media) – digital news aggregator with a nationalist-populist and sensationalist profile; a right-wing-oriented social media news feed. 126.1K followers on X.


SavunmaTR (X / social media) – specialised defence industry news aggregator with a nationalist-patriotic profile, targeting audiences interested in defence issues, with pro-government content broadly aligned with state narratives. 132.4K followers on X.





Kupür (@HaberKupur – X / social media) – digital news aggregator with a populist profile. 464.5K followers on X.


T.C. Millî Savunma Bakanlığı – Ministry of National Defence – 3.7M followers on X and 1.3M followers on Instagram.






Ensonhaber (X / social media) – digital news aggregator and pro-government tabloid with a sensationalist profile. 614.5K followers on X.

ConflictTR (X / social media) – open-source intelligence (OSINT) and conflict news aggregator with a nationalist-patriotic perspective, focusing on regional security, military developments, and geopolitical events. 1.1M followers on X.






SavunmaSanayiST (X / social media) – specialised defence industry analysis and news platform with a technocratic yet nationalist-patriotic profile, strongly focused on Turkish defence projects and developments in the aerospace sector. 472.7K followers on X.


TRT Haber – state-funded public broadcaster, controlled by the government and serving as an official channel of state messaging. 4.5M followers on X.





Savtekdergi (X / social media) – account of a specialised defence and technology publication with a technocratic and nationalist-patriotic profile, focusing on aerospace, advances in military technology, and the Turkish defence industry. 11.5K followers on X.

SanayiSavunmaTR (X / social media) – specialised defence industry news aggregator with a nationalist-patriotic profile, focusing on military technology, developments in the Turkish defence industry, and geopolitical news. 41.7K followers on X.





Kommunikatsiya (X / social media) – official Russian-language account of the Directorate of Communications of the Republic of Türkiye (T.C. İletişim Başkanlığı). A state-funded official diplomatic communication channel, pro-government in orientation, serving strategic public diplomacy and the dissemination of state narratives. 2,092 followers on X.

Comment posted under an Ekonomat post.

Ekonomat (@ekonomat_pl – X / social media) – Polish-language financial and economic news aggregator focusing on macroeconomic data, market trends, economic developments in Poland and globally, and corporate news, generally presenting data-driven content in a technocratic tone.






Comment posted under a NEXTA post.

NEXTA (@nexta_tv – X / social media) – Eastern European digital media outlet and news aggregator, originally established as a Belarusian opposition channel. It has a pro-Western, anti-Kremlin, and liberal-democratic profile, focusing primarily on the war in Ukraine, regional geopolitical conflicts, human rights violations, and anti-authoritarian movements.

Comment posted under a Clash Report post.

@clashreport (X / social media) – global open-source intelligence (OSINT) and armed conflict news aggregator focusing on real-time combat footage, geopolitical flashpoints, and defence technologies worldwide, operating a highly active and fast-paced international news feed. 869K followers on X.





Comment posted under a Clash Report post.

Comment posted under a Clash Report post.



Conclusions

The first significant finding is the clear securitisation of how Polish-Turkish relations are portrayed. Although the visit's agenda covered the economy, transport, energy, culture, science, tourism, relations with the European Union, and regional developments, NATO, security, and the defence industry were particularly prominent in the Turkish information space. The visit to ASELSAN, Poland's previous purchases of Turkish systems, the Bayraktar UAVs, and the presence of Polish troops at İncirlik together created a coherent narrative of Poland and Türkiye as states that not only benefit from NATO's security but also actively contribute to it.

At the same time, this does not imply full strategic alignment between the two countries. The material analysed reveals differences in emphasis. Poland views security primarily through the prism of the Russian threat, the war in Ukraine, and the responsibilities of NATO's eastern flank. Türkiye combines this dimension with Black Sea security, developments in the Middle East, migration, terrorism, and energy security. These differences do not necessarily lead to conflicting interests. On the contrary, they may provide a basis for cooperation between two countries that play important roles in two distinct but increasingly interconnected areas of the Alliance's security.

The second significant finding is the central role of the defence industry in the Turkish portrayal of cooperation with Poland. The visit to ASELSAN received extensive coverage in both traditional media and on specialised social media accounts. Of particular importance is the prospect, repeatedly raised in the analysed material, of moving beyond a buyer–seller relationship towards more extensive cooperation, including joint production, technology transfer, exchange of experience, and the development of operational capabilities. At the same time, not all of these elements constituted concrete outcomes of the visit. Some reflected perspectives presented by the Turkish defence industry or interpretations offered by the authors of analytical pieces. Future communication should therefore clearly distinguish between signed agreements, political declarations, and potential directions for future cooperation.

The third finding is the high degree of repetition in media coverage. Political divisions within the Turkish media did not automatically translate into fundamentally different portrayals of the visit. A substantial proportion of the material was based on reporting by Anadolu Ajansı and Demirören Haber Ajansı, official statements, and remarks by the two presidents. Differences emerged primarily in topic selection, headlines, and additional interpretations. Business-oriented media emphasised the USD 15 billion bilateral trade target, while defence-focused media and social media accounts concentrated on ASELSAN and NATO. Some pro-government outlets made greater use of the historical dimension of Polish-Turkish relations.

A particularly notable example is the narrative about the Ottoman Empire's non-recognition of the partitions of Poland. Karol Nawrocki's remarks were amplified by some media outlets far beyond what the president himself had stated. Yeni Şafak and Yeni Akit used them to construct a positive image of the Ottoman political tradition, while in one case the meaning of Nawrocki's statement was altered by removing his qualification that this narrative was rooted in Polish historiography. This demonstrates that history remains an important instrument of Polish-Turkish communication, while also being susceptible to reinterpretation to suit the needs of Türkiye's domestic political discourse.

A further dimension of the Turkish information space concerns the reliability of the sources that constitute it. Ülke TV's coverage of the visit provides a clear-cut example: its headline explicitly announced a UAV-related gesture towards Poland, yet the material itself contained no such gesture, transfer, or agreement of any kind. This is not a case of editorial framing or political emphasis — it is a headline that describes something that did not occur. In an information environment where many outlets reproduce the same wire content, a single misleading headline can shape audience expectations independently of the underlying facts, and Ülke TV's output from this period should therefore be treated as an unreliable source in any further analysis of the visit's coverage. A related problem arises in Yeni Akit's treatment of President Nawrocki's remarks on Ottoman history. Nawrocki spoke in Polish and framed his statement carefully within the register of historiography: the non-recognition of the partitions, he noted, has become firmly established in Polish historical writing and functions as a symbolic narrative. Yeni Akit's translation stripped this qualification entirely, presenting what was a conditional historiographical observation as an unequivocal statement of historical fact. The distinction matters: Nawrocki deliberately avoided making a categorical claim, and the translation erased precisely the hedging he chose to include.

The analysis of social media, meanwhile, reveals a stronger shift towards visual, military, and technological messaging. Accounts associated with the defence industry, state institutions, security-focused news aggregators, and the OSINT community were particularly active. This suggests that, on social media, coverage of the visit served not only as information about a diplomatic event but also as content concerning the capabilities of the Turkish defence industry and the position of both countries within NATO.

The comment sections beneath social media posts reveal a dimension of the information space that the main body of coverage does not capture. While a considerable number of Polish and Turkish comments were positive and friendly in tone — expressing mutual admiration, solidarity, and enthusiasm for the bilateral relationship — negative or critical reactions remained in the minority. Yet it is precisely this minority that is analytically significant. Beneath posts by Clash Report and NEXTA, a recurring reference to the Battle of Vienna in 1683 emerged — users noting, with varying degrees of irony, that Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire were on opposing sides at one of history's defining confrontations. One Polish user commented that Poland should have joined the Turks at Vienna; a Turkish user invoked 1683 as a living memory. The similar historical relationship that pro-government Turkish outlets were presenting as an unbroken tradition of mutual respect was being simultaneously reread, by both Turkish and Polish users, as a more contested and ambivalent history.

The economy was another important component of the visit. The achievement of USD 10 billion in bilateral trade and the establishment of a new target of USD 15 billion, the activities of Turkish companies in Poland, and interest in the Three Seas Initiative demonstrate that the relationship is not limited to security issues. At the same time, the economic dimension of cooperation received less coverage than the defence industry and NATO. This creates room for a more deliberate effort to strengthen the economic dimension of the partnership.

The visit also underscored the European Union's importance in Polish-Turkish relations. Erdoğan repeatedly highlighted Poland's support for Türkiye's EU accession process, a point noted by media outlets across the political spectrum. From Ankara's perspective, Poland may therefore be seen not only as a bilateral partner and NATO ally, but also as a country capable of supporting the development of Türkiye's relations with the EU. Overall, the analysed material indicates that there is scope to build a more strategic Polish-Turkish partnership, but such a partnership should not be based solely on converging security interests. The durability of the relationship will depend on whether defence cooperation is complemented by economic ties, transport, energy, institutional and societal contacts, and on whether both countries can use their different regional perspectives as a source of complementarity rather than divergence.